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Abstract—A blockchain, such as Bitcoin, is an append-only,
secure, transparent, distributed ledger. A fair blockchain is
expected to have healthy metrics; high honest mining power,
low processing latency, i.e., low wait times for transactions and
stable price of consumption, i.e., the minimum transaction fee
required to have a transaction processed. As Bitcoin matures, the
influx of transactions increases and the block rewards become
insignificant. We show that under these conditions, it becomes
hard to maintain the health of the blockchain. In Bitcoin, under
these mature operating conditions (MOC), the miners would find it
challenging to cover their mining costs as there would be no more
revenue from merely mining a block. It may cause miners not to
continue mining, threatening the blockchain’s security. Further,
as we show in this paper using simulations, the cost of acting in
favor of the health of the blockchain, under MOC, is very high
in Bitcoin, causing all miners to process transactions greedily. It
leads to stranded transactions, i.e., transactions offering low trans-
action fees, experiencing unreasonably high processing latency.
To make matters worse, a compounding effect of these stranded
transactions is the rising price of consumption. Such phenomena
not only induce unfairness as experienced by the miners and the
users but also deteriorate the health of the blockchain.
We propose BitcoinF transaction processing protocol, a simple,
yet highly effective modification to the existing Bitcoin protocol
to fix these issues of unfairness. BitcoinF resolves these issues
of unfairness while preserving the ability of the users to express
urgency and have their transactions prioritized.
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain, introduced in Bitcoin [1] by Nakamoto, is an
append-only, secure, transparent, distributed ledger, storing
data in blocks connected through immutable cryptographic
links, with each block extending exactly one previous block.
In blockchain technology, the miners validate transactions that,
the users publish (create and broadcast). Miners add valid
transactions into the next block(s). Different miners attempt to
publish (create and broadcast) the next block. In Proof of Work
(PoW) blockchains, such as Bitcoin, the miner who solves a
cryptographic puzzle first is whose published block is accepted
as the extension. Each miner has a different puzzle, yet of the
same level of difficulty, which needs computations to solve.
In Bitcoin, there are two types of rewards offered to the
miners: block rewards and transaction fees. Block rewards are
incentives that the miners are allowed to pay to themselves,
minting currency in every block mined, regardless of the
contents of the block. Transaction fees, on the other hand,
are incentives offered by the users to the miners to prioritize
their transactions. In Bitcoin and similar PoW blockchains, the
miners invest resources, such as electricity and hardware, in
such computations in anticipation of these rewards.
It is due to the investment on the part of the miners that
they benefit from the health of the blockchain. In the context
of this paper, we characterize the health of a blockchain by (i)
the fraction of mining power held by honest nodes; higher,
the better (ii) processing latency: one of the performance
parameters of the blockchain; lower the better, and (iii) the
price of consumption; lower the variance, the better. All of
these three metrics are linked to the perceived value of the
blockchain and its currency. If the health of the blockchain is
good, it is prudent to say that the underlying crypto-currency
possesses a good value.
One of the key differences between traditional currency
and Bitcoin is inflation control. To control inflation, block
rewards are halved every four years in Bitcoin. Over time,
a scenario develops, in which block rewards are negligible,
and the only incentive for the miners is the transaction fee,
i.e., the transaction-fee-only model (TFOM).
When the block rewards are high in value, we say the
Bitcoin protocol satisfies individual fairness for the miners
as it is believed that the current block rewards at least cover
the marginal costs of mining blocks. Since the miners are
not hard-pressed for revenue, they can include transactions
for free in the order that they arrive. This not only ensures
that no transaction is stranded but also ensures that the price
of consumption does not rise. A blockchain ecosystem is fair
for the users if it has (i) low processing latency and (ii) stable
price of consumption. Currently, the Bitcoin ecosystem is fair
to the miners and users. The vital question we study is, do
these three notions of fairness carry forward to TFOM?
The authors in [2] showed that in TFOM under low influx
(incoming volume of transactions), the rational miners will
undercut instead of following default strategy. While this
analysis considers the impact of rational miners in TFOM
w.r.t. forking, it does not consider the processing latency and
the price of consumption.
In this paper, our goal is to quantify fairness to the miners
and the users and study the impact of TFOM under standard
influx. Standard influx refers to the case when influx on an
average is equal to the maximum outflux (processing capacity)
of the blockchain. The two conditions, TFOM and standard
influx, inherently go hand-in-hand as the Bitcoin matures [3].
Thus, making it very important to study and contemplate such
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Fig. 1: Transaction Fees vs Processing Latency [4]
scenarios. In this paper, we analyze Bitcoin in TFOM and
under standard influx, which we term as mature operating
conditions (MOC), and show that it is unfair for both miners
and users. This unfairness, in a nutshell, is exemplified in
Fig. 1. We observe that those paying lesser transaction fees
are expected to wait upto 9 blocks, and those who pay an
insignificant amount of fees are expected to experience a
processing latency of 14 blocks.
In TFOM, even when transaction volumes are sufficiently
high enough to fill the processing capacity of the blockchain,
it is not assured that the miners earn sufficient revenue.
Insufficient transaction fees can be a major issue, as this puts
the blockchain at a security risk due to the possibility of
reduced honest mining power, which in turn will deteriorate
the health of the blockchain, reducing its value, and hence
further dropping of the honest miners.
Miners following First-In-First-Out (FIFO) processing en-
sures low and reasonable processing latency, avoiding strand-
ing transactions entirely. Since no transactions are stranded,
the price of consumption does not increase. Hence, miners
following FIFO help sustain the blockchain’s health through
good performance and maintaining a stable price of consump-
tion. In Bitcoin, under MOC, we show that miners following
FIFO processing take heavy losses as compared to the ones
mining greedily. This is an issue, as miners depend entirely on
transaction fees to sustain mining and cannot take considerable
losses in order to follow FIFO processing. This results in all
miners processing transactions greedily. As we show in our
analysis, this causes transactions to experience unreasonably
high processing latency; such transactions are referred to as
stranded transactions. This leaves the users with uncertainty
about whether or not their transactions will be processed. A
compounding effect of stranded transactions is the rising price
of consumption. These issues culminate in unfairness for both
the miners and the users. Thus, we say that Bitcoin, in its
current form, is unfair under MOC (Proposition 1).
We solve these issues of unfairness by proposing a novel
protocol, BitcoinF, for processing transactions. BitcoinF en-
forces a minimum transaction fee and uses two queues, instead
of one to process transactions. BitcoinF allows the users to
express urgency and have their transactions prioritized, just as
they can do in Bitcoin. Our game-theoretic analysis proves that
the proposed modification to Bitcoin, BitcoinF, ensures good
health of the blockchain. Thus, we believe BitcoinF will lead
to a stable ecosystem and hence will be fair to the miners
and the users (Proposition 2). While there have been many
published works analyzing TFOM, using collected data or
using game-theoretic models, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first formal attempt at solving the pressing issues
that are bound to arise in TFOM.
II. RELATED WORK
There are many papers in the literature studying transaction
fees offered in Bitcoin. The authors in [5] study the behavior
of transaction fees over a period of time, whereas Li et al.
[6] conduct a theoretical analysis of a queuing game to study
the transaction fees, and both conclude that the users paying
lesser fee faced higher processing latency. The authors in [7],
point out that if transaction fees were to be determined by
the free market alone without a block size limit, it would be
detrimental to Bitcoin as the fees would eventually become
zero and miners will no longer have an incentive to mine.
Easley et al. [8] develop a game-theoretic model, based on
observational data, to study transaction fees and explain the
behavior of miners and users in equilibrium. The authors
in [9] conclude briefly that transaction fees would not play
any major role unless the underlying rules of Bitcoin are
changed. However, [10] suggests otherwise, clearly stating the
importance of transaction fees and suggest increasing block
rate to check congestion and increase miners’ revenue. The
authors in [11] study the effects of transactions paying a small
fee and block size limit on the transaction confirmation time
using queuing theory. The authors in [12] study how the users
tend to offer high fees for their transactions to get included
in the block when the demand exceeds block capacity, they
model the confirmation time as a particular stochastic fluid
queuing process.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we focus on Bitcoin when operating under
mature operating conditions (MOC), i.e., when blocks re-
wards are negligible (Transaction-fee-only model (TFOM)),
and there is standard demand (influx on an average is equal
maximum outflux). First, we define all the important terms.
Then, we present our model and describe our assumptions.
Next, we explain how we simulate miners’ behavior and users’
behavior.
A. Important Definition
Definition 1 (Honest miner): We say a miner is honest
or non-adversarial if it does not willingly attempting to
disrupt the Bitcoin ecosystem by adding invalid transactions
to blocks, attempting to double spend or by extending other
than the longest chain.
Definition 2 (Rational Miner): We say a miner is rational
if it; continues mining when individual fairness for the miners
is guaranteed, acts in favor of the health of the blockchain if
the cost of doing so is marginal.
The act of processing transactions simply involves selecting
the transactions from the set of received but yet unprocessed
transactions, adding them to the block and then publishing the
block. This is also known as mining, and it is performed by
miners. The system requires a honest majority of miners to
maintain the security of the blockchain, vis-a-vis persistence,
against adversarial miners. Persistence is a property that must
be ensured by blockchains; It ensures that the confirmation
(different from processing transactions) of a transaction by an
honest node is never disputed by any other honest node. In
this paper, we consider that all miners are honest but rational.
Miners are incentivized to participate in honest mining by
rewards. If the miners are not compensated appropriately for
their mining efforts, the rational, though honest miners may
choose not to mine. Thus reducing the honest power in the
network, weakening the blockchain against adversarial attacks,
adversely affecting the health of the blockchain. When a
miner chooses to stop mining, they are essentially giving up
on the value of the blockchain and hence giving up on the
significantly high investment they have in it, either in the form
of the mining equipment or in the form of the blockchain
currency token they hold.
Besides persistence, another property that must be ensured
by blockchains is liveness. Liveness ensures that a transaction
will eventually be processed; however, it is not sufficient as
it does not guarantee that transactions will not get stranded
for a long time, let alone be processed in a reasonable
amount of time. As the blockchain technology matures, to
maintain competitive performance, a blockchain must ensure
that transactions are processed within a reasonable amount of
time, i.e., low processing latency. Furthermore, another reason
to avoid stranded transactions is that it leads to increasing
price of consumption, further deteriorating the health of the
blockchain. While stranded transactions can be avoided by
simply restricting the amount of transaction fee offered to a
single value, this trivial solution is unacceptable as the users’
ability to offer a range of fees is required to express urgency
and importance in a setting where there is varying demand.
Definition 3 (Processing Latency): Processing latency refers
to the duration, which we measure in terms of blocks, between
a user publishing a transaction and a miner processing it
(publishing a block containing it).
Definition 4 (Stranded Transactions): Stranded transactions
are those transactions, that experience unreasonably high pro-
cessing latency ( > 100 blocks).
Definition 5 (Price of Consumption): The price of consump-
tion is the minimum transaction fee, as perceived by the users,
that must be paid for the transaction to be processed.
Definition 6 (Health of a Blockchain): Health of a
blockchain is characterized by (i) the fraction of mining power
held by honest nodes (ii) processing latency and (iii) the price
of consumption.
For the security of the blockchain, mainly Bitcoin, more
than 50% of miners should be honest; higher, the better.
This is an essential aspect for the system to be fair to both
the honest miners and the users, as the decentralized nature
of the system depends on it. Processing latency, one of the
performance parameters of the blockchain, is the time taken to
process a transaction. It is crucial to the blockchain’s usability
and adopt-ability. It also ensures that transactions are not
stranded in the system and are added to the blockchain within
a reasonable time. The price of consumption is the minimum
transaction fee that must be paid for the transaction to be
processed; for stability; lower the variance, the better.
The health of the blockchain would be better if more miners
are honest. Given the miner’s stake in the ecosystem they
participate in, it is fair to say that they would act in favor
of the health of the blockchain as long as the cost of doing so
is marginal.
Definition 7 (Individual Fairness for The Miners): We say
the given blockchain protocol satisfies individual fairness for
the miners if the rewards from a block are at-least the cost of
mining it.
Definition 8 (Fairness of The Users): We say the given
blockchain protocol satisfies fairness for the users if the users
experience
(i) reasonable processing latency,
(ii) stable price of consumption (i.e., fmin), and
(iii) decreasing average processing latency with increasing η.
Definition 9 (Fair Blockchain): We say that the blockchain
ecosystem is fair if it satisfies individual fairness for the miners
and fairness for the users.
Since acting in the blockchain’s favor yields optimal results
required for the blockchain to perform competitively, it is
imperative that miners do not deviate from it. Deviations from
FIFO processing can not be clearly detected and hence can
not be actively discouraged; the only solution is to create
an environment that ensures that the miner cannot benefit
from such deviations. We quantify this as a game-theoretic
equilibrium. LetM = {m1,m2, . . . ,mk} be the set of miners
and S be the set of strategies for the miners in the blockchain
to act upon.
Definition 10 (-Expected Dominant Strategy Equilibrium):
We say s = (s∗m1 , s
∗
m2 , . . . , s
∗
mk
), s∗mi ∈ S is -Expected
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium for the miners if for all the
miners,
Eftxn(s′mi , s−mi ) < (1 + )Eftxn(s
∗
mi
, s−mi )
∀s−mi ∈ S−mi , ∀mi ∈M
where s′mi 6= s∗mi . s−mi and S−mi , indicate the strategy
profile and set of strategy profiles, followed by the miners
except mi. The expectation is w.r.t. randomness in influx of
the transactions and the variance in the transaction fees.
The above definition may be too strong and difficult to achieve.
Hence, we also work with the following, a weaker equilibrium
concept from game theory.
Definition 11 (-Expected Nash Equilibrium): We say s∗ =
(s∗m1 , s
∗
m2 , . . . , s
∗
mk
), s∗mi ∈ S, is -Expected Nash Equilib-
rium for the miners, if for each miner, the expected revenue
per block by following any strategy is not more than (1 + )
times what it would have obtained by following s∗mi ; provided
the other miners are following s∗−mi . I.e.,
Eftxn(s′mi , s
∗
−mi ) ≤ (1+ )Eftxn((s∗mi , s∗−mi )) ∀s′mi ∈ S, ∀mi ∈M
where, s∗−mi indicates the strategy profile in s
∗ by the miners
except mi. The expectation is w.r.t. randomness in influx of
the transactions and the variance in the transaction fees.
B. Model
For a tractable analysis, we simulate the execution of the
Bitcoin protocol in steps of 10 mins, i.e., each block is
published (created and broadcast) every 10 mins. Typically,
the time duration between two consecutive blocks is random,
with the expected value of 10 mins. We assume that each
block can contain a maximum bsmax number of transactions.
It is important to note that the maximum size of a block
in Bitcoin is an inherent limitation of the Bitcoin protocol
[13], [14]. In our analysis, we assume, in accordance with
the standard influx condition under MOC, the number of
transactions that arrive in each step is not constant and follow a
Poisson distribution with mean bsmax. A Poisson distribution
is prudent here as the influx is a discrete number of events
(w.r.t. arriving transactions) occurring in step, which is a fixed
interval of time, with a known constant rate of bsmax. Hence,
the average influx (in terms of the number of transactions) is
equal to the maximum outflux (i.e., maximum block size).
Here, outflux is the transactions that are processed by the
miners.
We split the transaction fee offered by the user as, ftxn =
fmin + fextra. fmin is the minimum amount of fee, as
perceived by the user, that must be included for the miner
to process the transaction; it reflects the price of consumption.
f0min ≤ fmin, is the minimum transaction fee set by the
protocol, and hence it is the initial value of fmin that the users
start with. As there is no restriction on the minimum ftxn in
Bitcoin, f0min is 0 as per the protocol. The fextra is the extra
fee the user would like to give to the miners to prioritize their
transaction over others.
We model the aggression of a user towards fextra through
a parameter 0 ≤ η <∞; higher the η, higher the fextra. Each
user, when publishing the transaction, calculates the amount of
extra fee they would like to pay as a monotonically increasing
function, fextra = φ(η). Let ψλ(η), a pdf characterized by a
static parameter λ, be the distribution that captures the fraction
of users having aggression level towards fextra as η.
During each step, transactions are collected by the miners.
At the end of each step, the miners form a block out of
the currently unprocessed transactions followed by “instantly”
publishing it. This merely a simplification of the process of
continually updating the block while attempting to solve the
cryptographic puzzle along with the assumption that a block
would be mined by the end of the step.
We consider two modes that the miners may operate in; i)
greedy processing, where miners greedily include transactions,
i.e., they include the highest or lowest valued transactions,
whichever may be more profitable ii) FIFO processing, where
miners process transactions on a First-In-First-Out basis.
These two modes of miner operation form the strategy space
of the miners. Since the influx, as well as outflux, is in terms of
the number of transactions, it is understood that all transactions
are considered to be of the same size in terms of the space
taken on the block. Hence greedy processing only considers
the transaction fee offered and not the size of the transaction
in bytes.
Assumptions on Miners’ Behaviour: We assume that all
miners are honest but rational. The rationality of the miners
implies the following:
• Miners would continue to mine and sustain the
blockchain, as long as mining costs are covered.
• Since the health of the blockchain is crucial to the value
miners obtain from mining, and that all miners inherently
understand this, miners act in favor of sustaining the
health of the blockchain, i.e., follow FIFO processing,
if the cost of doing so is marginal.
Assumptions on Users’ Behaviour: We assume that the user
would like to have his transaction processed within a reason-
able time and that their inclination to have their transaction
prioritized is characterized by their aggression level, η towards
paying a higher fextra. This assumption implies the following:
• The user chooses ftxn by first considering the fmin
and then deciding fextra = φ(η) where η captures its
aggression parameter. Note that, the system need not
know the η for each individual user, but for analysis,
we use the distribution of users against η (i.e., ψλ(η) is
known).
• The user observes transactions, below a certain threshold
of fees, being stranded, they concede to making the
presumption that this threshold of fees is the new fmin,
in the sense that transaction below this fees will not be
processed in a reasonable time. This is because a user
will not attempt to publish a transaction if they do not
expect it to be processed.
C. Simulation Setup
Since the theoretical analysis is intractable in such a com-
plex scenario. We use simulations to support our arguments.
For a fair and consistent analysis, we use the same simulation
setup and parameters to simulate both Bitcoin as well as our
protocol. All simulation results were averaged over 10 runs.
As mentioned in Section III-B, the execution of the protocol
in consideration, proceeds in steps. Each step represents the
time between blocks. At the end of each step, a block is added
to the chain. Each block has a maximum capacity, bsmax =
1000, in terms of transactions. All the simulations are run in
the setting where the average influx is Poisson distributed with
mean equal to bsmax.
We take, ψλ(η) = λ · e−λ·η , an exponential distribution
characterized by λ = 3, where λ is the rate parameter of the
exponential distribution. φ, the function used to calculate the
fextra a user with aggression parameter η gives, we take to
be φ(η) = fextra = eη − 1.
We take the granularity of the size of miners in terms of
their mining power to be δ = 0.05; and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 to be the
fraction of miners that follow greedy, while the rest follow
FIFO.
To observe the cost of mining as per FIFO as opposed
to acting greedy, and further investigate the establishment
of equilibrium, we simulate both, BitcoinF and Bitcoin with
varying values of β. We then consider the resulting average
revenue per block mined for both FIFO and greedy behavior,
in both BitcoinF and Bitcoin. The fraction of mining power
controlled is represented in the simulation by setting the same
fraction as the probability of mining a block.
To emulate the user’s characteristic of observing the change
in fmin based on the stranded transactions, we use epochs of
observation. Each observational epoch is a series of subse-
quent steps at the end of which the users change their fmin
accordingly. At the end of each epoch, the users check the
average processing latency of transactions that were published
in this epoch. The highest transaction fee that, experiences
an average processing latency high enough to be considered
stranded, is considered to be the new fmin. The length of the
observational epoch, i.e., the number of steps the users observe
after which they change their presumption of fmin, we take to
be 1000 steps. We use 100 to be limit to the processing latency
in units of steps, after which we consider a transaction to be
stranded.
Now we study Bitcoin protocol in the next section.
IV. BITCOIN TRANSACTION PROCESSING: ANALYSIS
UNDER MOC
First, we describe Bitcoin protocol, and then explain what
assumptions we make, highlight the specifics of Bitcoin sim-
ulation, and the inference from the simulations.
A. Bitcoin Protocol
In Bitcoin, the market for “space on the block” is a
completely free market (FM), there is no regulation on how the
transactions must be processed or how much transaction fee
must be given. In Bitcoin, a block contains only one section
(we refer to this as the FM section) where there are no re-
strictions (except our assumption on the maximum number of
transactions per block, i.e., block size). The users publish only
one instance per transaction containing ftxn = fmin+ fextra.
Initially, fmin = 0 as the Bitcoin protocol does not state any
minimum transaction fee that must be included.
In TFOM, each miner must collect transaction fees to
sustain their mining efforts. Even when assuming an influx
of transactions that is on an average sufficient to fill the
blocks, there is no guarantee that the incoming transactions
will contain sufficient transaction fees to sustain the mining
efforts. Hence, individual fairness for the miners can not be
established.
In Bitcoin, while the block rewards alone are sufficient to
sustain mining efforts, the rational miners can be expected
to process transactions in a FIFO manner, especially since
the number of users offering a competitive fee is minimal.
However, under MOC, we assume in our analysis that when
processing transactions from the FM queue to be added to
the FM section of the block, the miners pick the transac-
tions offering highest transaction fees, as shown in Fig. 2a.
The miners could choose to follow FIFO while processing
transactions from the FM queue. They might want to do
this to preserve the health of the blockchain. However, we
expect our simulation-based game-theoretic investigation into
the establishment of equilibrium will yield that the miners lose
a large part of their revenue by following FIFO processing in
the FM queue. Hence the miners cannot be expected to act
in favor of the blockchain’s health as the loss is considerable.
Thus, we assume the miners will gather transactions greedily.
The users suffer as a consequence of the miners not being
able to follow FIFO processing. Not wanting to follow FIFO
would not be cause for concern to the users if the influx
of transactions to be processed was low. If the influx of
transactions is low, then no matter the transaction fees, all
transactions would be included in the next block. In low
influx scenarios, the competition is not high, and the users
realize that there is no need to pay any more than a marginal
fee, as their transaction would get included in the next block
regardless. However, as we show in our analysis, issues arise in
higher influx scenarios where the users must pay competitive
fees to have their transactions processed or risk having them
stranded. Further, since these stranded transactions are public
knowledge, this, as we see in our analysis, causes the price
of consumption to rise, adversely affecting the health of the
blockchain.
In Bitcoin, under MOC, as we show using simulations, there
are a large number of transactions that get stranded. This
causes the users to be uncertain about when their transaction
will be processed, or even if it ever will be. These stranded
transactions are public knowledge. Thus, over a sufficiently
long series of consecutive steps, if it is observed that there are
transactions that are stranded, the users are likely to treat the
highest transaction fees offered by the stranded transactions as
the new fmin to avoid their transactions being pushed further
down in the queue. Given this new fmin, the phenomenon will
repeat. Depending on the observations of stranded transactions,
fmin can increase, decrease (not below f0min), or remain
constant. We study what is likely happen for fmin Bitcoin
via simulations.
B. Simulation Specifics
Since the miners only include transactions greedily, to
emulate miners in this scenario, we have only one section (FM
section) of the block, which spans the entire capacity of the
block, to which we keep adding the highest valued transaction
till the block is full. As per the Bitcoin protocol, we keep the
initial fmin = 0.
(a) Bitcoin
(b) BitcoinF
Fig. 2: Transaction processing in Bitcoin and BitcoinF
First, we conduct simulations to investigate the estab-
lishment of equilibrium, which we expect to state that to
follow greedy processing is -Expected Dominant Strategy
Equilibrium validating the assumption that the miners follow
greedy processing from the FM queue. We assume the same
in our simulation estimating average processing latency and
the change in fmin with observation epochs.
C. Simulation Results and Inference
First, we discuss the result of our investigation of equilib-
rium of miner behavior in the Bitcoin ecosystem. The strategy
space of the miners here is S = {FIFO, greedy}, where
s ∈ S is the mode of processing (as in Section III-B) of the
miner in the FM queue.
Clearly, from Fig. 3a, we see that:
Eftxn(s′mi , s−mi ) < (1 + )Eftxn(s
∗
mi
, s−mi )
∀s−mi ∈ S−mi , ∀mi ∈M
where s′mi = FIFO, s
∗
mi = greedy and  = 0.
Intuitively, miners make significantly higher revenue if they
followed greedy processing as opposed to FIFO processing
regardless of β. Thus we say that following greedy processing
in the FM queue is -Expected Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
with  = 0.
Confirming our assumption about miner behavior, we now
discuss the results of our simulations regarding the fairness of
the blockchain. As we can see from Fig. 3b, the fmin rises
with observational epochs. This causes instability in the price
of consumption. The figure also implies that when the influx
has not been standard for long enough, Bitcoin cannot ensure
that mining costs will be covered, i.e., individual fairness for
miners is not guaranteed. In Bitcoin, Fig. 3c shows that, the
users that have very little aggression towards paying fextra,
experience unreasonably high processing latency, i.e., stranded
transactions. These stranded transactions, in turn, cause the
price of consumption to rise, as seen in Fig. 3b.
These observations are summarized as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: If the miners strategy space is S =
{FIFO, greedy}, it is -Expected Dominant Strategy Equi-
librium for the miners to follow greedy with  = 0. As a
consequence, the Bitcoin ecosystem is not a fair under MOC.
V. ACHIEVING FAIRNESS UNDER MOC
As discussed in the previous section, under MOC, Bitcoin
faces challenges. To resolve this, we propose a simple modi-
fication to Bitcoin, which we call BitcoinF.
A. BitcoinF
To solve the issues of unfairness for both the miners and
the users, we propose a protocol to process transactions. Our
approach is two-fold: Firstly, we enforce a minimum fee
of f0min(> 0) that is to be included in every transaction.
Secondly, we introduce a section in the block that only accepts
transaction instances with ftxn = f0min, called the FIFO
section of the block. So now, there are two sections in the
block: FM and FIFO. The FIFO section has a size of α·bsmax,
whereas FM has the remaining. This is illustrated in Fig. 2b.
In our simulation of BitcoinF, we set α = 0.2.
Formally, we propose BitcoinF as a block validation rule.
This rule will have two parameters, α, and f0min. Miners
shall only accept and extend blocks that follow the rule.
We expect that when this protocol is implemented, it will
be enforced by the honest miners, as is commonplace in
blockchain ecosystems.
Definition 12 (BitcoinF: Block Validation Rule): Each block
must contain α · bsmax transactions offering ftxn = f0min.
A typical execution is described as follows:
• Users when they want to add a transaction to the
blockchain broadcast two instances of the same trans-
action; one instance that has fextra = 0, and the other
instance where fextra is as chosen by the user. Both
instances must include at least f0min as required.
• The miners collect these instances of every transaction
and add the instance with fextra = 0 to the FIFO queue
and the other instance, the one with fextra to the FM
queue.
• When an instance of a transaction is processed, the other
instance is invalidated.
• The block can have transactions in the FM section only
if the FIFO section of the block is completely filled. The
honest but rational miners naturally would first add as
many transactions as possible to the FM section from the
FM queue (they may do this however they please, but
naturally they choose the ones with highest transaction
fees), while keeping aside sufficient transactions to fill
the FIFO section of the block. Then, the miners fill the
FIFO section of the block with transactions selected from
the FIFO queue in a FIFO manner.
When processing transactions from the FM queue to be
added to the FM section of the block, the miners naturally pick
the transactions offering the highest fees. Further, we assume
that while processing transactions from the FIFO queue, the
miners follow FIFO.
The miners could choose to follow greedy processing, i.e.,
add the minimum valued transactions instead of following
FIFO processing to fill the FIFO section. They might want
to do this, as FIFO processing might process some slightly
higher valued transactions through the FIFO section of the
block, voiding the fextra it offers; thus, by following greedy
processing, the miners process the least valued transactions
through the FIFO section, while keeping the slightly higher
valued transactions (which would otherwise get processed
(a) Difference in revenue of FIFO
and greedy
(b) fmin vs steps (c) Processing latency vs η (d) Trend w.r.t. alpha
Fig. 3: Simulation Results
through FIFO) for later, to be processed through the FM
section of the block. However, we expect our simulation-
based game-theoretic investigation into the establishment of
equilibrium will yield that the miners gain a negligible profit
by following greedy processing as opposed to FIFO processing
in the FIFO queue. Hence the miners can be expected to act
in favor of the blockchain’s health as the loss is insignificant.
Thus, we assume the miners will follow FIFO processing in
the FIFO queue.
B. Simulation Specifics
The size of the FIFO section is set to be α · bsmax = 200
transactions, to which transactions are added in a FIFO man-
ner. The size of the FM section is set to be (1−α) · bsmax =
800 transactions, to which transactions are added greedily.
The FM queue is processed before the FIFO queue, as is the
expected behavior of the miners. To emulate the random order
of the transactions’ arrival during a step, when processing from
the FIFO queue, random transactions are picked from the set
of transactions with the highest processing latency. As per the
protocol, initially, the value of f0min is set appropriately to
compensate miners, we, in our simulation, set it to be 0.005.
First, we conduct a simulation to investigate -Expected
Nash Equilibrium which we expect to state that to follow
the FIFO is -Expected Nash Equilibrium validating the as-
sumption that the miners follow FIFO processing from the
FIFO queue. We assume the same in our simulation estimating
average processing latency and the change in fmin with
observation epochs.
C. Simulation Results and Inference
First, we discuss the result of our investigation of equi-
librium of miner behavior in the BitcoinF ecosystem. The
strategy space of the miners here is S = {FIFO, greedy},
where s ∈ S is the mode of processing (as in Section III-B)
of the miner in the FIFO queue.
Clearly, from Fig. 3a, we see that:
Eftxn(s′mi , s
∗
−mi ) ≤ (1+ )Eftxn((s∗mi , s∗−mi )) ∀s′mi ∈ S, ∀mi ∈M
where s∗ = {FIFO,FIFO, . . . , F IFO} and  = 0.00037.
Intuitively, miners gain negligible profit if they followed
greedy processing as opposed to FIFO processing in the
FIFO queue when β = 0. Thus we say that all miners
following FIFO processing in the FIFO queue is -Expected
Nash Equilibrium with  = 0.00037.
Here, -Expected Nash Equilibrium is clearly a much
weaker property than the one established by BitcoinF. Mo-
tivated by the analysis in [15], where the authors consider a
fraction of agents (our case miners) following honest strategy
and remaining agents follow greedy strategy, it is easy to
see that our protocol exhibits -Expected Dominant Strategy
Equilibrium with  = 0.00037 when β ≤ 0.55. The protocol
does not establish -Expected Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
for all β, as after a point, the fraction of miners following FIFO
processing in the FIFO queue drops low enough that transac-
tions start to get stranded, raising the price of consumption
and hence raising the average revenue of all miners.
Confirming our assumption about miner behavior, we can
now discuss the results of our simulations regarding the
fairness of the blockchain. As seen in Fig. 3b, fmin remains
constant with time. This implies a stable price of consumption.
Since the f0min can be set as per requirements to cover min-
ing costs, BitcoinF guarantees individual fairness for miners
under MOC. Fig. 3c shows that in BitcoinF, no matter the
users’ aggression towards paying fextra, the users experience
reasonable processing latency. Since there are no stranded
transactions, the price of consumption does not rise, as seen
in Fig. 3b. In fact, under MOC, the users would know what
processing latency to expect as soon as they publish the
transaction. If their η is higher than a certain η break-point,
then their transaction will get processed almost immediately; if
not, they know the upper bound on the processing latency they
will experience. This trade-off between the η break-point and
processing latency below the η break-point as a function of α
is visualized in Fig. 3d. These simulation based observations
can be summarized as Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: If the miners strategy space is S =
{FIFO, greedy}, it is -Expected Nash Equilibrium for the
miners to follow FIFO with  = 37∗10−5. As a consequence,
BitcoinF ecosystem is a fair under MOC.
D. Security Analysis
A strategic and intelligent miner could attempt to use our
protocol to leverage an unfair advantage. In this section, we
Fig. 4: Depiction of swapping
show that such attempts are not quite effective and hence, do
not threaten our protocol.
a) Ignoring the FIFO Section of the block: The miners
would ideally like to ignore all the f0min instances of the
transactions. The miners cannot do this as any valid block
requires that the FIFO section of the block must be filled
entirely before any transactions are added to the FM section of
the block. Also, all transaction instances in the FIFO section
are only supposed to offer f0min fee.
b) Swapping in transactions that are about to be pro-
cessed through FIFO queue: The miner can always process
a transaction of lower value, say transaction a, than it should
from the FM queue, by swapping out a transaction of higher
value, say transaction b. Please refer to Fig. 4. The miner
might be inclined to do this if a is about to be processed via
the FIFO queue, whereas b is not. The miner might want to
do this if he notices that a is, in fact, of higher value than
what is typically included in the FM section. In this sense, the
miners keep b held out, to be swapped in later (finally) for
another transaction, say transaction c, that is lower in value
as compared to b and a, thus realizing a profit. The miner
may swap several times (swapping out transactions b, b′, b′′
...) before finally swapping out transaction c.
Note that during this attempt, it is easy to see that the
miner is risking losing a profit as he is betting on finding the
transaction c. He may not find such a transaction if the lowest
value of the transactions included in the FM section never
drops sufficiently, or the miner does not maintain a mining
monopoly, and some other miner mines the next block gaining
the risked amount.
The theoretical analysis of this attack strategy is not
tractable, and nor is the simulating the attack feasible due to
the complexity of the actions available and state-space. Thus,
to show that this attack is ineffective, we give the adversary
generous and impractical advantages and show that even in
the best case of executing this attack in the backdrop of our
simulation, the adversary gains as little as less than 1% of the
total rewards gained.
Since the transaction a must ultimately be swapped with a
transaction c, we simply consider the number of potentially
ultimately successful swaps, as the minimum of; the number
of transactions processed by the FM queue, that are valued
below the maximum value of the transactions processed by
the FIFO queue; and the number of transactions processed by
the FIFO queue, that are valued above the minimum value
of the transactions processed by the FM queue. We multiply
the value obtained by the difference between; the maximum
value of the transactions processed by the FIFO queue and the
minimum value of the transactions processed by the FM queue.
In our simulations, the resultant value turns out to be less than
0.59± 0.29% of the total value of transactions processed.
Now, this is clearly an over-valuation for the following
reasons; (i) The risk of the attempt is completely ignored here.
(ii) The number of ultimately successful swaps considered
is the result of the best (perhaps better than the practical
best) possible exploitation of the one-to-one correspondence
of the swapped transactions by the adversary. (iii) The value
of profit gained with each successful swap is just taken to
be the maximum profit gained from the best possible swap.
(iv) The attacking miner is assumed to have a monopoly over
mining, i.e., the attacking miner is the only one mining and
hence can carry out this attack unhindered, i.e., without the
possibility of another miner publishing a block impeding the
attacking efforts.
E. Discussion
The parameters of BitcoinF, α and f0min can be chosen
by consensus and should be agreeable by both the min-
ers and the users; we suggest α = 0.2 and f0min =
average cost of mining a block
bsmax
. If α = 0, then BitcoinF
reduces to Bitcoin, whereas α = 1 would be strictly FIFO.
Bitcoin, as we have seen, is not fair. Strictly FIFO processing
disables the ability of the users to express urgency, and the
average processing latency will not decrease with increasing η,
which is a requirement for fairness for the users. An f0min too
low will discourage mining, an f0min too high will discourage
usage of the blockchain.
While we have chosen specific functions and parameters
for φ and ψ, we believe that any monotonically increasing
function for φ and any monotonically decreasing function for
ψ would yield similar yet scaled results.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied Bitcoin under mature operating
conditions (MOC), i.e., in TFOM and standard influx. To
study a given blockchain, we introduced notions of fairness
(i) for the miners and the users, and (ii) the health of a
blockchain. Under reasonable assumptions, we showed using
simulations that miners act greedily in Bitcoin, as it is -
Expected Dominant Strategy Equilibrium to do so, and as
a consequence, Bitcoin ecosystem is not fair. To achieve
fairness in Bitcoin, we propose BitcoinF, a simple yet powerful
modification to Bitcoin. In BitcoinF; each transaction must
include a minimum amount, to ensure that transaction fees
cover marginal mining costs under MOC; and must have
a minimum number of transactions offering the minimum
specified amount. We showed using simulation analysis that
in BitcoinF, miners act in favor of the health of the blockchain
as it is -Expected Nash Equilibrium, and as a consequence,
BitcoinF ecosystem is fair.
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